

THE NORTH SHAMALAN

A Survey of Land and People

Helmand Valley, Afghanistan

by

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CONTENTS

	Page
General	1
The Project	3
Attitudes	6
Landowners	8
Fragmentation	9
Large Landowners	13
Place of Residence	16
Dependence on the Land	18
Sharecroppers	19
Water Management	30
Crops	35
Housing	35
Wells	37
Need for Further Studies	38
Summary and Conclusions	41
List of Terms	46
Attachment 1 – Questionnaire	48
Attachments 2 – Sketch Maps of Shamalan	49-50
Attachment 3 – Further Tables on Household Size and Number Of Agricultural Workers per Household	51

LIST OF MAPS

Map No.	Page
I. Cadastral Map	3
II. Barakzai Holdings by Sub-Tribe	9
III. Non-Barakzai Holdings	11
IV. Holdings of Larger Landowners	13
V. Holdings by Place of Residence	16

THE NORTH SHAMALAN: A SURVEY OF LAND AND PEOPLE

General:

The purposes of this report are several but it is mainly an attempt to outline the nature of the population that lives in, works or owns the first 2.7 kilometers of the North Shamalan, as such information directly relates to the problems faced or to be faced by the Shamalan Project. Some of the questions dealt with came from individuals in the USAID Mission who are working directly with the project, involved in project design, land consolidation, etc. Some are of particular interest to the researcher as they appear relevant to the overall functioning of the scheme. Last, for those who are working with the plan it is necessary to have a “feel” for the general social and economic structure that only comes from such studies.

To date there has been relatively little information systematically gathered on these people whose lives are about to be affected by our project. Who are they? What are their tribal affiliations, clan, sub-tribe or lineage and how do these Affiliations relate to land holdings, sharecropper-owner relations, and water-management? What are the residence patterns of the different types of socio-economic groupings studied and how will these patterns complicate or simplify the administration of the project. These are some of the kinds of questions broached in this report.

Some of the information presented here as background was gathered during the

last week of March and the third week of April 1971, having been previously reported in memorandums to Mr. A. R. Baron dated 3 April and 6 May 1971. Most of the present data, all of that which is quantitative, was gathered using a prepared questionnaire (included as Attachment 1) by the writer using an interpreter hired for the study – a young man with a high school education, a native of the area whose father farms in central Shamalan, of the Barakzai tribe, and as it turned out, a distant relative of many of those interviewed.

The study concentrated on the population of the first 2.7 kilometers of North Shamalan, the area first to be affected by the project. The south boundary of the study area is the road which cuts directly across the valley from the auto-bridge drop-structure off which the Bolan lateral springs. This is certainly an arbitrary but convenient boundary for the study area, and several landowners' holdings were south of the boundary.*

There were 146 villagers, owners, sharecroppers, laborers, *mullahs*, craftsmen and others interviewed, each representing a separate household.

*In this report the following distinctions will be made with reference to areas:


1. The study area – the first 2.7 kilometers of the north end of the Shamalan Project area as shown on all maps.
2. The Project area – that part of the Shamalan Valley to be affected by the Shamalan development plan which begins in the study area.
3. Reference will be made to residence outside the study and project area, usually in the near (1-6 miles) villages of Basharan and Babaji.
4. References will be made to the place-of-origin of sharecroppers now working

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
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MAP No. 1
CADASTRAL MAP
NORTH SHAMALAN



Government Land
 House Site



in the study area; a relatively high proportion coming from districts to the north of the Helmand Valley in a band stretching from Kandahar to Farah with some concentration from the Navzad-Musakale-Kajaki districts.

An attempt was made to put a time limit on the study to illustrate how much information could be gathered in a short period of time with a minimum of personnel. This is not to say that further in-depth studies of specific interest should not be done. The level of trust of our research group could not be built among the villagers in a period of three weeks to be able to get clear understanding of, for example, the local socio-political structure. Some clear indicators were evident, some working hypotheses were developed but some of the important relationships were not clearly understood. We should have more information to better pin-point potential trouble spots.

The Project

The Shamalan Project has been on the drawing boards since at least 1965 when the J. G. White Engineering Corp. began to draw up a program schedule for the area development. Originally the project area was described as consisting of... “31,399 acres of irrigable land...in a gross area approximately 40 miles long by 2 ½ miles wide.” (Report by C. G. Burrell, Dec.1967). This development area is on the west bank of the Helmand River, between the river and the escarpment to the west which marks the beginning of the desert. The road from Lashkar Gah to the Nad-i-Ali/Marja development areas cuts across one of the northern districts of Shamalan, Bolan.

In possibly a gross over-simplified statement of the project, it is to include the cutting of a new main lateral off the present Shamalan Canal along the base of the escarpment to the west, beginning at the northern tip of plot No. 202 (see Map No. 1) A new symmetrical system of irrigation ditches and drains are to be developed in square patterns. Land consolidation of the numerous irregular and fragmented parcels is to be instituted to fit this new system. And the area is to be systematically leveled. These activities will all combine to increase the technical efficiency of the total irrigation system and among other things make better use of available water.

One complicating element in this plan is for the land leveling activity, as much as possible, to leave vineyards, trees and housing untouched. Given the necessity for the rearrangement of plots in squares and the consolidation of one owner's fragmented holdings in one place, combined with the realities of the locations of lines of trees presently marking the borders of fields, vineyards and orchards of irregular shapes in strategic locations, and scattered housing, the task will prove formidable. See Attachments 2 for a sketch map of the study area in relation to the Shamalan Project Area.

The location of the new lateral as shown on Map No. 1 is only approximate. Since the lateral is to run along the base of the desert escarpment, and in most cases the fields have tended to be developed as close to this geographic boundary as possible, some of the fields will of necessity be reduced in size. According to the plan, with land consolidation, this loss will be shared by all the landowners on a percentage

basis. In this first 2.7 kilometers at least, probably only one house, No. 124, will be affected by the lateral itself. This is the house of one of the five larger landowners, a migrant to the area of 9 years, of Said descant (a descendent of the prophet Mohammad) and a potential hazard in the early stages, to be discussed in more detail later.

To run smoothly, this project must have the cooperation of the people to be affected. The fields to be leveled and consolidated are areas presently being profitably cultivated, a high proportion being double-cropped. The present irregular borders of the fields and clusters of holdings by kin groups represent the results of a traditional system of land tenure and inheritance. There is a traditional system for the distribution of irrigation water. These things, along with many other aspects of the socio-economic system will be affected by this project. Acceptance of such basic changes, not to mention cooperation with them, come hard. There are numerous unknowns, even to the planners. But farmer cooperation, if even to a great extent passive, is necessary for the project to succeed. The farmers are the ones who must live with the project while the changes are being made as well as profit from the results.

Two of the crucial elements in generating farmer acceptance, if not cooperation, are: trust in the agents of change (government), and information about the change. Thus public relations and public information activities are basic to the effective implementation of the Shamalan development scheme.

Until the summer of 1971 little had been done in terms of a systematic approach to the population in general to inform them of the details of the Shamalan plan. The past involvement in public information had been at such a low key that virtually no one had been able to hear the official voice. The approach instituted during the summer of 1971 was to indoctrinate the extension agents in the policies and principles of the project and have them inform the villagers. They have had at least one training seminar. But the information services must go further. These villagers are interested in how the project will affect them, what the plans are for particular pieces of land. And they want to be told before the actual work in the field begins. This means technicians in the field with maps, diagrams, etc., to explain to the farmers on the ground what is about to happen.

Attitudes:

The farmers' attitudes towards the project, based on our varied inquiries, have been mixed but mostly negative. There are a variety of rumors about the project which is to be expected in all situations where the realities are not clearly and continuously spelled out to the group. One rumor is that the landless are to receive land via the project. There were the only individuals (landless *buzgar* sharecroppers) that were positive in their attitudes toward the project. Some of these and other common migrant laborers approached the research team during the last period of study to be sure their names were recorded in interview with this stated potential in mind.

To date there have been several groups of village men (landowners) to go to Lashkar Gah to discuss and object to the project. A number of men contacted in this study period were among these groups. They included some of the wealthier, most influential and respected men in their communities. The information or the interpretation of the information they gathered on these occasions should be considered a cross between wishful thinking and what they may have been told. They made interpretations of policy statements ranging from: the project depended on the desires of the peoples; if they did not want it, it would not happen; to some fairly accurate statements of policy on not leveling houses, vineyards and trees, and being paid for crop loss. Still, none of these landowners were for the project. Their stated reasons and rationalizations were many: they figure they will lose land to the new system of ditches and drains (correct); they will lose at least one crop, a loss of income even if compensation is paid (correct); there will be too much water on the land, bad drainage, and salting as they see on the down slope side of the present Shamalan canal (incorrect, given the new system of proposed drains); they are happy with what they have, see themselves as successful farmers on good land and are satisfied with their increasing incomes (they rank near the top on income per jerib of the different sections of the Helmand Valley); they see the effect of land leveling as a major loss in fertility (correct, temporarily). Unstated by the owners but clearly observable on the ground, some of these men will lose the use of some government land which they now cultivate.

They were as adamantly against the process of change, and those involved in it,

(the government civil servants) as they were against the change itself (in their less thoughtful moments). They made numerous accusations of having to “bribe” the cadastral officials to have their land recorded. One owner condemned survey crews for stepping on melons and vines, and referred to the project as a make-work activity for civil servants who have nothing to do.

From all this we see the level of frustration about the project building. As one malik pointed out, however, they realize that the villagers are powerless to do anything about it. He speculated that if the statements of payment for crop loss and no destruction of houses, trees and vineyards occurred, there would likely be no major events of active confrontation.

Landowners:

At least part of the Shamalan has been farmed for centuries and the irregular borders, distribution and fragmentation of the land in the area under study suggest that the plots are the product of a long-term indigenous system of ownership. The Muslim system of inheritance is, in simple terms, the equal division of property among the children, with the daughter receiving one-half share of a son. It is common in Middle East rural communities for daughters not to take, or be given, their share of inheritance. In the present area of study, no woman’s names appear in the records as being owners. From this we might assume that they do not or rarely inherit land.


According to local statements, the Barakzai tribe concentration extends in a belt from at least Farah, if not Herat, to Kandahar, and they refer to the Helmand

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MAP No. II
CADASTRAL MAP
NORTH SHAMALAN
BARAKZAI HOLDINGS BY SUB-TRIBE



SUB-TRIBES

- NASIRZAI
- HOJAKZAI
- IBRAHIMZAI
- ALIDINZAI
- WALIZAI
- MASIRZAI
- ADAMZAI
- SHADIZAI
- ISAZAI



Valley as something implying the Barakzai Valley. The area is apparently traditionally Barakzai territory and this is reflected in land ownership in the Shamalan. In the area of study, 71 of the 80 (89%) landowners' names on which we have data are of the Barakzai. The others including Said, Nurzai, Saqzai and Baluch have brought in the area in the past 9-15 years.

The average size household for the landowners is 10.8. This differs from the average household size given in the 1965 Stevens-Tarzi report of 8.4 and in Dr. Owens' 1970 Farm Economic Survey (F.E.S.) of 9.5. The only apparent explanation for this difference is that the two previous surveys were on samples of the entire Shamalan while the present attempted to get complete coverage of a small section (possibly atypical) of the Shamalan.

Of these 80 households, 35 were simple; that is, they were made up of one married couple, children plus the possibility of other attached relatives. Forty-five were extended households; that is, they contained more than one married couple. This means that 56 percent of the owners' households were extended and does not give great support to the usual generalization that most farm families are extended. See Attachment 3 for more details on average size family and number of agriculture workers per household.

Fragmentation: There are about 104 names on the cadastral list associated with 92 plots of land, excluding 4 governments plots. This data does not give a picture of fragmentation generally associated with the Muslim system of inheritance. There are

a number of factors that cover the real level of fragmentation; one being that the number of plots (25) have multiple owners listed (3 or more owners). Within this, several of those groups of owners have interests in more than one plot. The following table gives some examples:

<u>Plot Nos.</u>	<u>No. Owners</u>
145, 171	4
157, 159, 161	4
160, 187	4
166, 168	4
176, 177	5
182, 184	4
189, 191	4

This means that by the cadastral records there are numerous plots with several joint owners, plots that have not yet been officially divided. On the ground we found that some of these plots in fact had already been divided long before but for simplicity in paying taxes, the official records indicated one plot. In other cases, the multiple owners represented one household of brothers that had not yet separated, future real fragmentation.


In at least three cases, land was listed under a group of sons' names while the father was still the living head of the household. The purpose of this last escapes me, except that large blocks of land would not be associated with a single individual in case of a government land redistribution scheme. Another possibility is the rumor

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MAP No. III
CADASTRAL MAP
NORTH SHAMALAN
NON-BARAKZAI HOLDINGS



TRIBAL AFFILIATION

- SAID
- NURZAI
- SAQZAI
- BALUCH
- TARIKZAI



that larger land holdings are to be taxed at a much higher rate than small. For the project, all of this means that land consolidation will be a complex affair, and the new arrangement of plots, (the real not necessarily the official) will have to take these details into consideration.

There were 41 plots, not including house plots or government land, with single owners. The average size of these plots was 13.3 *jeribs*. If the exceptionally large Plot No.142 was not included, the plots would average 10.5 *jeribs*. There were 33 plots with 2 or more (up to 8) owners. The average size plot was 9.2 *jeribs*. This would indicate that there may be some attempt on the part of the villagers not to fragment the plots beyond a usable size, in which case land consolidation may not be found by the villagers to be such an unpalatable program, given much care in coordinating the plan with the peoples' desires.

The reason is unknown but it should be noted that the most highly fragmented section appears in the form of a rough "T" , Plot Nos. 145, 125, 155, 164, etc. This section belongs to the Barakzai sub-tribe or lineage of Alidinzai, who live In Basharan. (See Map. No. II). This is a block of 16 plots and a total of 39.8 *jeribs* or 2.5 *jeribs* average per plot.

Multiple ownership is as follows:

<u>No. Owners</u>	<u>No. Plots</u>
1	6
2	5
3	0
4	4
5	1

To further complicate fragmentation, Plot Nos. 154, 155, and 164 have the same two joint owners, Nos. 157, 159 and 161 have the same four joint owners, and Nos. 146 and 165 have the same two joint owners. The land consolidation plan Must sort out this ownership-fragmentation complex before the present boundaries Of fields disappear. The mirab-malik of Basharan is included in this grouping.

Map Nos. II and III show blocks of ownership by sub-tribe or lineage which gives us some indication of land distribution at an earlier unfragmented period in history. The sub-tribes, at least in theory, are patri-lineal groups who trace their descent back to a common male ancestor. In this case it appears that the common ancestor may not be very distant given the patterns of limited fragmentation. No attempt was made to tie the various lineages together via their real or fictionalized more distant kinship relations. At the time of land consolidation, it would probably be useful to make further contacts on the question of homogeneous sub-tribe plots. The question that did not appear relevant to pursue until after this data was plotted on a map was on


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MAP No. IV
CADASTRAL MAP
NORTH SHAMALAN

HOLDINGS OF LARGER LAND OWNERS



Tribal Affiliation

- Said
- Nu'zai
- Hojakzar
- Nesirzai
- Ibrahimzai

0 200 400

which basis would groupings be more effective, sub-tribe or place of residence, a later section of this report.

Larger Land Owners:

There are five men who own 367.3 of the 915 *jeribs* in the study area. This amounts to 40 percent of the land. Two of these are relatively recent migrants into the area and are not of the Barakzai tribe. No. 202 is a Nurzai and owner of Nos. 120, 122, 123, 124, and 130 is Said. The other three are of Barakzai sub-tribes; the owner of Nos. 134, 135, 138, 140, 141, 142, 178 and 180 is Nasirzai. Nos. 181, 182, 183, 184 and 195 belong to a Hojakzai, and owner of Nos. 198 and 199 is Ibrahimzai. The size of each of the holdings is as follows:

<u>Affiliation</u>	<u>No. <i>Jeribs</i></u>
Said	45.2
Nurzai	54.0
Ibrahimzai	42.3
Hojakzai	68.6
Nasirzai	157.2

The reasons for the lack of fragmentation of these holdings probably relates to: lack of time in the case of recent immigrants (the owner of Plot No. 202, for example, has an extended household approaching 40 in number); and probably low fertility over a number of generations. The usual paradox associated with the politico-economic orientations of the people in Muslim rural communities is that

high fertility is desired because numbers of adult males in the household is directly related to the political power of its head within the community, the number of loyal supporters. The same value relates to economic status since without machinery a large labor force is necessary for production, given land. At one point in the history of the Muslim world there was apparently a surplus of land vis-à-vis the population. Expansion of one's holdings was related to the amount of land a household could work. But high fertility in one generation, and so power and wealth (also directly related to power), will mean relative poverty in the next with equal distribution of land among at least a large number of sons. This is under present conditions of limited land. While the value may still be on high fertility, it is dysfunctional. Low fertility means greater land holdings through the generations, wealth and power via supporters who are economically obligated to give support.

In the present case, with an available labor force on a sharecrop basis, a different basic structure is present. Power and wealth still stem from the land and labor force, except we find a system of patronage rather than kinship. In at least two of the cases of large landowners, it was pointed out that their larger households did not work the land but generally spend the time supervising the sharecroppers. The need for a large labor force household no longer holds the same value. While it may be some fluke in our statistics, this pattern could be responsible for the fact that our sharecroppers (50-50 sharecroppers, Kashtagar) have on the average larger households than the landowners.

In any case, there can be little doubt that these large landowners have a good deal of local political power since they have a high proportion of the total land area and the largest blocks of sharecroppers obligated to them. In some ways they apparently have a great deal to say about water uses. Given the limited amount of time in the field, I have no clear idea as to the level of cooperation between these local centers of power. There were indications of continual indigenous political maneuvering for the advantage of one group over another but at the same time the ability to consolidate vis-à-vis an outside force. More study is necessary for a clear picture to emerge.


The real position of the Said household in the socio-political structure is not known. As a landowner, the head has the same potential for influence as the other larger landowners. As a member of Islam's most holy and respected lineage living within the Pushtun tribal area, the potential for influence is much greater. Until we learn what function this household serves aside from simply being an immigrant landowning member of the community, we can only speculate on the basis of a socio-political study of a Pushtun valley in Swat (Barth, 1959) where Said families were requested to move into an area, given land and other support, acted as neutral mediators in feuds, and served the numerous religious needs in the community. They represented the centers of religious learning, and headed what possibly amounted to embryonic Sufi orders (dervish or mystic religious orders), centers which further acted as organizing social institutions cross-cutting into the lineage structure. The potential for organized power of such an arrangement makes the

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MAP No. V
CADASTRAL MAP
NORTH SHAMALAN
HOLDINGS BY PLACE OF RESIDENCE



possible (but unknown) parallel worth mentioning.

Place of Residence: Most of the landowners in this section of the Shamalan live outside the valley itself, 73 of the 87 names on which we have this information or 84 percent. What this means in terms of the amounts of land controlled can be seen in Map No. V. Forty-nine of these 73 absentee landowners (67%) live in the village of Babaji, a highly fragmented village some 4-6 miles away. Twenty-four (33%) live in the nearer (1 mile) village of Basharan. Only eleven live on the land in the Shamalan while three others live in Lashkar Gah.

This pattern has several important implications for the project, and it is also evident in land use which is likely to differ from patterns of use further down the valley. As will be discussed, a great proportion of the land is worked by sharecroppers rather than by owners themselves and this includes even the relatively small landowners. The 50-50 sharecroppers (*kashtagars*) nearly all live on the land where they may work fields belonging to different individuals. The lower level 1/5 sharecroppers-laborers (*buzgars*) live nearly equally on and off the land. Those that live off the land frequently work on a single owner's plots, some located in the village area, others located in our study area. The number of persons actually living in the areas to be developed will increase as we move down the valley, possibly complicating the process of land leveling. I estimate on the basis of interviews completed that there are about 550-600 people living in the area surveyed. See Map I for housing locations. Certainly this is a small number when compared to the village complexes

found in central and south Shamalan.

When the villagers living in the area were asked about their *malik*, the administrative village headman, they usually named a man at their place of origin. There was no resident *malik* in the area of study but, as expected, the most commonly identified *maliks* were those of Basharan and Babaji. Sometimes these were even named by sharecroppers who were recent migrants to the area. Most of the land apparently comes under the jurisdiction of the Babaji *malik* because that is where most of the owners reside.

Administratively all this possibly complicates the project in that in cases of land disputes and other official action the *malik* plus the persons affected should be present. As our survey work indicated, these individuals are not always easy to contact. In terms of communicating the details of the project to the owners and others to be affected, the fragmented nature of the villages themselves, especially Babaji, will make the work very time consuming unless the villagers are brought to a central location.

To return to an earlier theme, projects like this require cooperation on the part of those being affected. This cooperation includes simply getting a number of people involved at a given place on the same day. Given the variety of locations of residence and the mixed administrative network, cooperation is required to accomplish even minimum levels of activity.

Dependence on the Land: So far we have discussed the distribution of land and how it is being worked. But how dependent are these landowners on their land in the study area? The patterns of residence in this section of Shamalan reflect the levels of dependence on the land and are quite different from what we should expect to find in most other areas. Many of these villagers own land in their villages outside the Shamalan, as well as that owned in the study area.

Four of the five larger landowners are primarily dependent on their Shamalan land. Three of these said they owned no land larger than a house-site outside the area. The largest owner, maintaining a house outside, said that his lineage owned large amounts of land outside but gave no indication that he received any income from this land. Owner of Plot No. 199 indicated that this land represented about half his holdings.

Assuming the clues we have as to local political influence at the indigenous level of these landowners are correct, care must be taken to insure that the program as conceived functions without fault. That is, unlike a large proportion of the landowners in this section, the men with the greatest potential to influence large numbers of people are also in a position to be the ones most hurt economically by a misdirected program, in terms of reimbursement for lands out of production and a prolonged length of time out. To project the program further down the valley, this will be increasingly the situation with larger and larger proportions of landowners after we move beyond the study area.

By contrast, 29 of the 76 landowners (38% on which we have this data) have at least half their land in the study area according to their own statements. This includes only five farmers with less than 10 *jeribs* of land total. Thus we have a relatively high percentage of landowners (62%) who own at least half their land outside the area. They will not be totally in the hands of the project economically.

It should be noted that no attempt was made to gather the more detailed data that would result in actual farm size. We asked the owners about land owned in the study area and land owned outside. We did not ask of the owners about other land worked under other arrangements. We learned of *graw* and rent agreements (not sharecrop) when we got to questions of crops planted.

Sharecroppers:

There are two types of sharecroppers at work in the Shamalan. The *kashtagar* may be generally defined as the farmer who shares the crop on a 50-50 basis with the landowner while usually sharing the input with labor, animal power and seed. He is usually the decision maker for a given plot of land but there is probably discussion of crop to be shared with the landowner. The *buzgar* is a sharecropper whose input is labor only. He makes no decision about the land and gets one-fifth of the crop. For more detail of definition of these types of sharecroppers for the region, see Dr. Owens' 1970 Farm Economic Survey.

There were a total of 59 sharecroppers, 27 *kashtagars* and 32 *buzgars* combined, interviewed. They represented 13 different ethnic or tribal groups including Arab,

Tajik, Baluch, Kakar, Said and Nurzai, Saqzai, Popalzai and Barakzai. They were all Pashtu speakers. There appeared to be no pattern of grouping by tribe or ethnic affiliation on given pieces of land. For example, a Saqzai, a Tajik and a Said were found working on a single plot as *buzgars*. One exception to this rule was when more than one member of a household was found working on the same plot.

There were only 4 Barakzai (the dominant landowning tribe in the area) who worked as sharecroppers. All but one came from outside the Helmand Valley.

There was a slight concentration of particular tribal groups represented with the Nurzai being the most numerous (14) and the Saqzai second (9). Although the total sample is small, these two combined represent nearly 40 percent of the total sharecroppers.

The significance of this pattern of tribal relations in sharecropping is likely a reflection of the attraction to this relatively well-off valley of individuals from regions where marginal, now possibly sub-marginal, agriculture is practiced. It is not a reflection of tribal dominance in any general sense, as recorded in other areas (Barth 1959), because the sharecroppers are migrants into the region. Stated places of origin supports this interpretation with 34 of the 59 sharecroppers (58%) coming from the area to the north in a band stretching between Kandahar and Farah, just south of the central massive area that becomes the Hazarajat.

The greatest source comes from the area of Navzad-Musakale-Kajakai, 26 men.

This area apparently has been recently hard-hit by drought with the korez systems drying up, but the problem may be of a longer term than the very recent recognition suggests. At least half the migrants from this area came 6-15+ years ago. The usual response to the question of why they left their place of origin regardless of date was that the water sources and field dried up. Although presently groundwater surveys are being made in that area, a quick survey of the population and their views add to our knowledge of the longevity of the problems. It sometimes takes a major disaster (the present drought) to call our attention to a possibly much longer-termed problem. Sources of migrant labor are usually a good indication of such problems and the places of origin of the sharecroppers down the Shamalan should be closely monitored.

As far as the data goes, something like 83 percent of the land is worked by one or both types of sharecroppers. (This does not include government land which apparently officially is unused but in reality is partially worked). For the project, such a high rate of sharecropping is a complicating feature, and results from the low levels of mechanization and probably the distance between place of residence of owners and the fields. It complicates the project since the sharecroppers represent a large population dependent on the land but having no legal claims or long-term rights to it (to be discussed more fully later). The project must take into account this displacement of people and their work animals. Long-term effects of the project likely include permanent displacement of a large segment of this group. The

combination of land consolidation (which will produce larger and fewer plots for a number of families – for a generation or two), land leveling (which will eliminate the need for the system of small block terracing presently used in the fields and simplify the process of irrigation), and an effective credit system and available tractors can only reduce the need for the large number of farm workers presently used. Some of the owner-sharecropper relations are quite complicated, involving several level of overlapping agreements for a given plot of land. Some examples follow:

Owner of Plot Nos. 167 and 169 (14.2 *jeribs*) is an absentee landlord living in Lashkar Gah, a government employee who bought into the area in recent years. Although a Barakzai, he is not of the local sub-tribes. He rented Plot No. 171 (7.1 *jeribs*) from a resident of nearby Basharan and has it worked by 3 *buzgars* of mixed ethnic and tribal origins – Said, Saqzai and Barakzai – who live (with one exception) in the housing compound (No. 169) provided by the owner, with a third family of 5, the *mullah* of the group. The work is generally supervised by the owner's brother who alternates living in Lashkar Gah and on the land. His crops include wheat with corn double-cropped, vegetables and melons for market. The owner has expanded his farm size through renting a contiguous plot and uses the least costly type cropper while living and working outside the area.

Plot No. 132 (23.7 *jeribs*) by cadastral records, is owned by four persons from Babaji. According to the owners, this plot has for some time been divided into 4 parts, each man representing a separate household. Three of the plots of about 19

jeribs total have been *gawed* (definition below) for a total of 46,000 Afs. at different times from two weeks to about 15 years, to a man (a non-owner in the area) who is *kashtagar* for the fourth plot. He had at least one *buzgar* working for him.

Graw refers to a form of money lending where a piece of land is turned over for use to the lender for an agreed upon amount. There is no interest charged but the lender can frequently get his investment back in crops in 1-3 years, according to local sources. Some of these arrangements are of long term but ownership of the property is never transferred and on the death of the lender, the plot should not be divided among his heirs. We identified 47 *jeribs* of land under this arrangement at present and another 57.8 *jeribs* said to be rented. Upon closer examination, some of this rented land may in fact be *gaw* – a possible error in recording.

A not uncommon problem with *gaw* arrangements is illustrated by plot No. 202 which is listed under one owner who states that he bought the land 10-15 years ago and has made noticeable improvements since, including a vineyard and some earth removal and land leveling, expanding the cultivable area. By cadastral records, the plot is 26.7 *jeribs*. BuRec surveyors indicate it is in fact about 54 *jeribs*. The difference is being ironed out, but the son of the original owner states the land was *gaw* and he intends to pay back the loan. In the meantime, the man on the land, with a very large extended family to work (between 35-40 persons total) plants and harvests his crops with the periodic help of some day labor. These kind of complications are likely to lengthen the delays associated with the project.

The large plot which includes No.142 totals 157.2 *jeribs* (see map of large landowners), and is worked by a combination of at least 8 *kashtagars* who hire as necessary, depending on the number of workers they have in their households, a series of *buzgars*.

The average distribution for land in wheat and double-cropped corn (the most common combination reported in this area) is about one *kashtagar* per 30-35 *jeribs*, who in turn has one *buzgar* per 5-8 *jeribs*. There are frequent exceptions to this ratio, usually being the result of a different crop. There is one plot of melons, 2 *jeribs*, in this lot, for example, being worked on a *kashtagar* basis. This crop takes more labor than wheat to plant, guard and dispose of, but the profits are greater.

Some men will work small plots as *buzgar* while working other plots as *kashtagar*.

Some work as *buzgar* in more than one location. A common pattern for *buzgars* was that they worked for a single owner who had land both in the Shamalan and in one of the villages of Basharan or Babaji. This affected residence patterns discussed below.

To record the complete complexity of these arrangements would require a more detailed interview schedule for each person which, while interesting, would be beyond the needs of the present survey, so long as we do not ignore the fact that these complex, overlapping arrangements exist.

Plot No. 172 (20.8 *jeribs*) offers another variation in complexity. According to the 7 owners, or 6 households, this plot is broken down into small plots of 3-6 *jeribs* each,

all of which is presently *grawed* to a Baluch living in Basharan; it has been for about 8 years. This man has a *kashtagar* (a Saqzai) who works one or two other plots as well. The plot is listed at present as a single piece with multiple owners probably because it is being worked as a single plot and because in the past one man paid the tax on the block for the others. The individual listed in the cadastral records as the grandfather of the present multiple owners is in fact directly related to only 2 of the 7. He was of the same tribe (Barakzai), sub-tribe or lineage (Walizai), and residence (Babaji), and he paid the land tax for the group.

These sorts of arrangements must also be dealt with in the process of clearing titles, arranging the right-of-way and land consolidation. As mentioned elsewhere, what happens when the men owning this plot jointly, by the records at least, also own other plots in other locations? To be able to deal with such issues we must first have a clear understanding of the details involved.

Sharecropping is usually done on a single crop basis, leaving room for a change of arrangements after each harvest. For example, Nos. 186 and 188 are owned by a single individual who bought into the area fairly recently. He lives in Lashkar Gah and works for USAID. On Plot No. 186 a young man, working with his father, was *kashtagar* for the wheat crop and for the doubled corn crop in process. But at the same time, he was *buzgar* on plot No. 188 for the wheat crop, becoming *kashtagar* for the corn. His father, same household and work animals, was also *kashtagar* on about 10 *jeribs* of wheat and corn (doubled) for a different owner of Plot No. 181.

The ideal stated by government officials, sharecroppers and landowners on the nature and tenure of cropper-owner relationships was that these were relatively long-term relations of patron and client, with sharecroppers working the same land over an extended period. This could include housing provided by the owner in the area or in the village of residence, if different, where the cropper might work land both in the Shamalan and in the more distant village.

While not included in the questionnaire, qualitative responses of a number of involved villagers indicated that the ideal was rarely accomplished because of the widely varying interests of the different parties at different times. There was a greater frequency of continuous relationships, however, between *kashtagars* and the largest landowner. Plot Nos. 134, 135, 138, 140, 141, 142, 178 and 180. Unlike the smaller owners whose demand for labor apparently varies significantly from year to year, if not from crop to crop, the large owner works no land himself so the demand for a stable labor force is continuous. Indications were that long-term relations reflect mutual satisfaction over the arrangement between the parties, and probably result in a higher productivity. They probably also reflect a greater concern (on the part of the owner) for indigenous political influence and power.

There are, apparently, no actual long-term agreements lasting beyond one growing season, and there were numerous examples where land worked for wheat by one person was worked for corn by another. The significance of this for planning is that there is not a crop planted, the landowner is under no obligation to support the

cropper. He is not likely to share the funds distributed by government for land out of cultivation while land is being developed. If there is a crop planted, the funds would be divided, as it would be in the case of a wheat crop cut and sold green for fodder rather than waiting for harvest. There is an obligation established with the crop. While the indications were that a landowner would not share the income from land out of cultivation with his croppers unless there was a crop already started, he might support some families on a loan basis, thus increasing the dependency aspect in the relationship. But little information was gathered on this possibility. A related topic is the apparent relationship between power, real or potential, and the patron role of dependence on the landowner. To a great extent a man's power is related to the number of supporters he has, whether this support is based on kinship or economic dependence. Aside from the different types of sharecroppers given housing by the landowners, (the largest such settlements being Plot Nos. 138 and 183), other laborers, craftsmen and tradesmen also reside there, adding to potential support on any given issue. There was an apparent oversupply of farm labor in this study area during the survey period, some of which were given housing in these villages, further increasing the size of the support group. There is a mosque and *mullah* that provide a central gathering place for the men for conversation, as well as a place and leader for worship, which no doubt adds to the cohesiveness of the otherwise heterogeneous grouping. Within this limited area there are 5 *mullahs*.

Family size and type do not vary greatly from that found for the landowners. The

average sharecropper household size was 10.2 as compared to 10.8 for the owners. As previously discussed in the section on landowners, Page 9, this differs from both the 1965 BuRec (Stevens-Tarzi) report of 8.4 persons per family in Shamalan, and Dr. Owens' 1970 F.E.S. random sample of Shamalan farm families of 9.5. Based on our experience in the present survey and the enhanced value of more detailed household data, any further survey work should include the more time consuming census type questions, at least in a pre-test stage.

The 59 sharecropper households included showed no major trend in favor of simple or extended families (30 extended, 29 simple). Of the 34 families whose origins are from the areas to the north, previously discussed on Page 21, 19 or 56 percent were simple families. We would expect these migrant families to be of a simple type and on the average smaller than landowning families or families that have found it unnecessary to migrate. The simple migrant family would represent the fragmenting of the traditional extended family under some sort of economic pressure. In support of this hypothesis, the landowners reflected an equal trend (56percent) in favor of extended families.

If the data is broken down further by type of sharecropper, of the 32 *buzgar* households 18 were simple, 14 were extended. For the *kashtagar* households, the numbers are 11 simple and 16 extended. The trend is that *kashtagar* households are more likely to be extended than the *buzgar* but the difference is slight. This trend is more clearly reflected in the differences in household size with the *kashtagar* at 12.4

(1.6 persons more than owner households) and the *buzgar* at 8.3. See attachment 3 for more detail. It should be noted that this further reduction of an already small number of households makes the difference suspect.

What can be hypothesized about this group of sharecroppers is that they share roughly the same family characteristics with the landowners because they either originate from the same region or they have been in the area long enough to develop these characteristics. The hypothesis to be forwarded on differences between *buzgar* and *kashtagar* households is that the latter tend to remain as larger and extended units more frequently because the profits as an economic unit are greater—they would not have to hire *buzgars* and further reduce their 50-50 share.

Residence patterns for the two groups also vary with 23 of the 27 *kashtagar* households living in the area of study while 4 live outside. This contrasts with *buzgar* households with 15 living in the area and 17 living outside. As mentioned, nearly all live in Babaji or Basharan where they usually also work land. Thus, in this area the *buzgars* may be less hard hit by the Shamalan going out of production than *kashtagars* because of their divided sources of work, but then they have more to lose to begin with. A clearly marginal income cut by half does not result in a subsistence level.

Given the patterns of residence and land use, we can suspect that the household data will vary from that in other sections of Shamalan. In areas where there are higher rates of resident owners of household workable size plots, the numbers and

proportions of the population working as sharecroppers will likely be reduced. To know the level of sharecroppers for any given area would be most useful to planners who must decide what to do with this segment of the population when it becomes displaced. And to repeat an earlier statement, the places of origin of the sharecroppers and length of time since migration should be closely monitored, and variations should be checked out, since migration is usually a reflection of troubled spots.

In terms of ease of study, the areas of Shamalan where owners and croppers live on the land rather than in neighboring and distant villages, the difficulties of contact will be reduced in future studies. With sharecroppers working land in Shamalan and in the villages of the owners, Babaji and Basharan, or in Nad-i-Ali or in other neighboring areas, there were some problems of contacting the men who worked the land.

Water Management

The water is controlled in this section of the Shamalan (after it leaves the main canal) by one indigenous water-master or *mirab*. He is a resident and the *malik*, the village headman, of Basharan. His father and grandfather had been *malik* before him. He has been *mirab* for the past 5-6 years, the post being an "elected" one in the sense that the landowners in some way choose him. We were told that the larger landowners have more say in the choice than the smaller ones; they pay a high proportion of his income. It was not absolutely clear as to why the previous *mirab* was replaced; one

statement was that he lived too distant from the place of his responsibilities.

The present *mirab* is of the Barakzai tribe and Alidinzai sub-tribe, which means, tribally and socially, he is one of the establishment, although not a large landowner nor of one of the three major landowning sub-tribes (an attempt at a relatively neutral *mirab*?) He owns 5 *jeribs* in the project area and 15 *jeribs* in Basharan; a *buzgar* works the 5 *jeribs*. He apparently is paid by the landowners (usually in kind) by the growing season for controlling the water distribution, according to the number of *jeribs* at a rate equivalent to $\frac{1}{4}$ *mon* of wheat (1 *mon* = 10 pounds) per *jerib* per crop. He indicated that he does not find his position as *mirab* or *malik* as easy to fill.

Given the land area under the control of this *mirab* this fee amounts to a sizable income. The area under his control was very simply defined. It amounts to all the land watered by the lateral which roughly follows the path of the proposed new Shamalan lateral, against the desert escarpment to the west. Or to define it in another way, all the land in the Shamalan to the north and west side of the Bolan lateral, limited at the southern end by the first irrigation ditch branching off to the west side from the Bolan lateral. This is an area approximately 6 kilometers long and, at its widest point, about 1 kilometer in width. The ruins of "Bolan castle" are just beyond the area's limit. This represents a rough curving diagonal border line running from the castle ruins (S.W.) to the auto bridge drop structure where the Bolan lateral begins (N.E.). See Attachments 2.

The significance of this arrangement for the project is that the first block to be

developed will not cover all the area of the first *mirab* of the system and will likely involve part of the lands whose waters are controlled by two different *mirabs*. While our present survey produced no clear indications of how this would complicate project administration, there are likely to develop conflicts of interest between *mirabs*. With land consolidation and squaring off the systems of laterals, drains and ditches, the present borders of the *mirab* districts will be eliminated.

The *mirab* had at least one man to aid him with water control and spent considerable amounts of time himself in the area to maintain some semblance of control.

According to the *mirab* and the farmers, water is given in turn, with the man with the land at the head of the lateral and the head of each sub-lateral being served first. But observation and further questioning indicated that the system was very flexible and that this flexibility not infrequently lead to arguments over water use. Individuals used water out of turn when their fields needed water, sometimes with, sometimes without an arrangement with the *mirab*. Some fields and crops would demand water more quickly than the full cycle could provide. At planting, harvest and replanting times some fields were prepared more quickly than others, thus varying demands for water. As much as possible it is the *mirab*'s job to schedule these out-of-turn uses, to settle disputes and to attempt to control the misuses before disputes occurred.

The *mirab* said that part of the problems related to the fact that not enough water was being released from the main Shamalan canal; the lateral delivering water to this area is small and never full. With the method of flooding each of the slightly terraced,

usually small paddies before allowing the water to flow to the next, the limited water makes the process more time consuming. (This is the local definition of the situation.) The full cycle of water distribution is thus too slow for some fields that dry more quickly than others. Water is used out of turn, by agreement or not, and the men at the end of the lateral get inadequate water.

Still, several sharecroppers complained that irrigation water was not equally distributed (even at the upper end of the lateral) – that if a more important or powerful man needed water, he took it regardless of the cycle and there was not much to be done about it. There were indications that water and its distributions relates directly to wealth and indigenous political power. There were some clues indicating that water is used periodically as a weapon. Although there are roles that in theory relate to all members of the community on an equitable basis (i.e. *malik* and *mirab* who serve an entire community of people), kin group obligations take precedence over the more generalized obligations according to local statements. And except in statements of the ideal, these villagers do not expect equal treatment where kin obligations are in play. It is significant that the *mirab* is of the establishment, and the villagers were quick to add that his tribal affiliation was important.

It is important to note that the government ditch-rider (the man responsible for letting the water from the Shamalan canal into the main lateral after which it comes under the control of the *mirab*) is the son of one of the 5 large land owners (Nos. 181, 182,

183, 184, and 195) and is counted as a member of that large extended household that lives on the land. He is a Barakzai but of a different sub-tribe or lineage from that of the *malik-mirab*. Given the limitations of time in the field it is difficult to estimate the relations between landowners and the *mirab* but the fact that the *mirab* was complaining that the ditch-rider was asking for payment (a bribe) to let more water into the lateral suggests some intra-tribal maneuvering rather than simply an extension of the *bakshish* system.

If present problems with water management are ever to be clearly understood, a more in-depth study of some of the *mirab*'s relations and activities must be made. Although we tend to look at water management as a technical problem, as long as it remains in the hands of the local, tribal, indigenous socio-political system, we must recognize and attempt to understand this probably most dominant variable in the situation. Control of irrigation water within this indigenous political system is synonymous with power. How it will be used, manipulated or neutralized will vary from area to area.

One already suggested possible solution to this non-technical aspect of water management would be to take water control out of the hands of the locals and put it in the hands of a neutral, adequately paid technician who could not be manipulated. Lacking this, the control would probably best be left in the hands of the *mirab* where continuous long-term training programs may eventually convince the farmers and the

mirab that it is to their better interests, if it is, to stick to a controlled schedule. The question must be continuously asked if some of the problems of “water-short areas” in Shamalan are not more the result of the socio-political system rather than technical in nature.

Crops:

No systematic attempt was made to record crop production in detail for the plots of land, although statements of major crops were asked.

There are relatively few vineyards and orchards in the area. All or part of Plot Nos. 123, 127, 169, 179, 182, and a small section of 202 are in orchard or vines. There is melon, vegetable and little cotton production in scattered plots but the main crop is wheat doubled with corn or mung beans. Of the 53 statements we have on main crops, 41 said wheat, double-cropped in corn, 4 said the wheat-mung bean combination, 3 wheat only, 4 corn only and 1 said a mung bean-corn combination. Considering the residence patterns and levels of sharecrop farming, we might expect this basic grain-bean farming system. It eliminates much of the need for guards and the problems of division of production. The other crops mentioned, which usually meant production was greater than simply home-subsistence consumption, were melons (7), vegetables (5), cotton (3), and tobacco (2).

Housing:

The pattern of settlement, (location of the housing is shown on Map No.1) is discussed at different points in this report. It was estimated that about 550 people live

in the study area, a small proportion of these being landowners.

The pattern of the highly mobile villagers found in central and south Shamalan do not appear in this area not do the temporary housing types of woven mat wall and roofs with mud plaster covering.

Some tents were in use by transit labor and in the fields for shelter from the sun during harvest time. The alternative to the tent, and more effective, was the leafy brush structure similar to an Apache “wicky-up” of the U.S. southwest, water being periodically sprinkled on the leafiness for cooling.

Most of the housing in the area consists of the thick-stacked mud walls with a pitched roof of logs, branches, some matting, grass or reeds with a coating of thick mud. This housing is relatively permanent, cheap, and according to locals, easily built.

The most permanent type housing -- the most expensive since it requires a specialist and possibly the most efficient in terms of protection from the heat -- is the arched-roof structure, the arch (which follows the lines of a Quonset hut) is formed with mud bricks and in this area sits on high, thick stacked mud walls. At the time of study there was a migrant mason from Girishk area whose previous profession had been *korez* digger and maintenance, living in compound Plot No. 117. This type of structure is apparently becoming more used in this area than in the past (indicating more stability of residence is not affluence) and found at least in Plot Nos. 198, 138, 177 and 169.

The housing of No.124 (the Said family) appears to follow the mud wall, flat roof construction of most of the Middle East, as permanent a structure as the arched roof in areas of low rainfall, and requiring relatively long and straight roof beams. This house, being located against the western dessert escarpment, is the one which will certainly be directly in the line of the new lateral to be dug. Being one of the larger landowners and of the most holy lineage in Islam, we should consider how much pressure might come from this direction to block or delay the plan.

Wells:

As part of the more comprehensive plan for the development of the Shamalan valley, the question of planning for the drilling or digging of water wells has been raised which would result in a more pure source of drinking water. At present, the system of irrigation ditches, drains and canals are used. When the question of wells was raised with the villagers, the first response was that they were unnecessary given the present resources. Running water was generally defined as being pure and the purity of well water was in question. Some indicated that at certain times of the year when the irrigation system was shut down, shallow wells were dug, but this was not the preferred state of affairs. The water was said not to be good but of the same quality as the drains which some used but not through preference.

To sum up, the development of wells as a source of pure drinking water may be instituted as part of a long-term indoctrination program in public health, along with

the idea of the advantages of boiling present sources of water. If hand pumps for shallow wells were made available at minimum costs through extension or some other source, accompanied by such a training program aimed at changing this cultural definition, then beginning sales could probably be interpreted as the start of the change. While the project might invest in pumps under the assumption that the introduction of the item itself would precipitate change (an assumption frequently proven false), to insure maintenance and use, it would be well for the villagers themselves to invest.

A major unknown variable in this discussion is the attitude of the women, who were not surveyed. Published studies of women of Muslim rural communities consistently show that they tend to be more traditionally oriented than men. While they may be even more dogmatic than men in this case in the value of running water and definitions of taste, they are also the ones who walk to the canals, ditches and drains to carry back the heavy skins of water.

Need for Further Studies:

Assuming that the present study proves to be of some value to project planners, administrators, and men working in the field, I propose a similar comprehensive study be made of the entire valley as the project develops with the survey being carried out just ahead of the changes. As I have indicated there is no reason to assume that the nature of the population or its relation to the land will remain

constant throughout the Shamalan. There are indications that there are some rather large variations, and these must be clearly understood if the planning for land consolidation, water management, and displacement, among other aspects of the program, is to relate itself to the people.

To the South, there are greater concentrations of landowners as well as laborers living on the land than we found in the north end of Shamalan. Indications are that there are more large landowners with larger plots of land, possibly divided over greater distances (with the highly mobile, more temporarily constructed villages mentioned above) which offer a different set of problems to be dealt with. There are pockets of settlers and possibly other ethnic or tribal groups to be identified which will indicate variations in the relatively homogenous Barakzai tribal pattern just discussed. These, too, will present unique problems of adjustment which we must be able to predict or handle effectively as they occur.

At present we find what amount to villages in the area but they do not represent administrative units; that is, their *maliks* live in villages outside the Shamalan. Many of the sharecroppers and other labor, being recent migrants to the region and not living in a village with a resident *malik*, names the *malik* from their place of origin as their representative and added they had no legal spokesman here. There are indications from earlier, more superficial studies in Aynak that this segment or class of rural population (sharecropper-laborer) had their own legal spokesman or *malik* separate from those that represent localized tribal segments. Knowledge of such

political structuring in given areas would simplify relations and communications with the groups.

As the political, administrative and village settlement arrangements coincide more (unlike the partial overlap of form in the present survey area), we can expect a more consolidated front on the part of the villagers on many of the issues of planning. Political maneuvering for advantages of one unit over another will become more obvious. And, again, we need to know in advance what structures we are dealing with if we are to have effective planning. While much of this type information may be known at the superficial level, piecemeal, by a variety of government officials, it has not been recorded nor combined into a total picture or system of relations, which is basic to understanding, effective planning and implementation. Systematically collected and recorded, the information could be available for all working in the area. The data could also serve as a basis for future evaluation of the effects of the project on the people.

There is a constant need for statistical data on population in this country and there is apparently some difficulty to collect basic census data. Although no attempt was made to systematically collect census type data on composition of the households, we not infrequently got involved in discussions that resulted in statements of numbers of wives and children, etc. If a more comprehensive study were instituted for the Shamalan, the interview schedule easily could be expanded to include this sort of data, sex and approximate age characteristics. Considering the simplicity of

the present interview schedule, or possibly a slightly altered version, local extension or other government personnel could collect the information without much difficulty.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS:

1. At the time of this survey, there had been a minimum of activity in the field of public information about the Shamalan Project; most villagers in the area of study knew little about its implementation.
2. In the context of past experience and the lack of information about the project, rumors about and negative attitudes toward the project had been generated. Moves were made to involve the extension agents in a program of public information.
3. Given the improved and improving incomes from farming in the Shamalan, the general feeling of the locals at the north end is that the project is not only unnecessary but is likely to produce long-term or permanent disruptions to their economy.
4. The households of landowners tend to be large, averaging 10.8 persons, with slightly over half (56%) being extended family types.
5. This section of Shamalan is owned mainly by people living outside the project area, 84 percent. Sixty-seven percent of these live in Babaji; 33 percent live in Basharan. Only 11 landowners live in the survey area while 3 live in Lashkar Gah.

6. Since official representation in government contacts is through the *malik*, (village headman) of the place of residence, the functions of government in the study area are slightly more complicated than in other parts of the Shamalan.

There are at least 2 *maliks* involved, neither residing in the study area.

7. About 89 percent of the landowners in the study area are of the Barakzai tribe.

This group if further broken down into 9 sub-tribes or lineages whose landholdings tend to be grouped. Some of these lineage holdings are more highly fragmented than others. The other non-Barakzai owners bought into the area within in past 15 years.

8. Three of the five larger landowners are of the Barakzai tribe. Four of the five use relatively large numbers of sharecroppers to work their land which places them in special positions of influence and power. At least three have housing to offer their sharecroppers. In total, these five landowners own 40 percent of the land area studied. Three maintain residences outside the Shamalan project area.

9. Of the regular landowners, only about 1/3 have half or more of their land in the study area, reflecting limited dependence on the Shamalan. In contrast, 4 of the 5 large landowners are primarily dependent on the Shamalan for their income.

This means that the owners with the greatest potential or real power and influence (the large landowners) are in the position of being the most likely to be economically injured by project errors and delays.

10. Land holdings in the area generally fragmented; that is, there are many small plots of land, a man's total holdings may not be located in one place, and something more than $\frac{1}{4}$ of the holdings have multiple (3 or more) ownership.

11. Only 4 of the 59 sharecroppers were of the Barakzai tribe. The others were from 13 different ethnic and tribal groups. Except where a household furnished all the labor for a piece of land, there was little grouping in evidence by tribe or ethnic group.

12. Forty percent (23) of the sharecroppers interviewed were of the Nurzai and Saqzai tribes. Fifty-eight percent came from districts just north of Helmand, generally agriculture areas dependent on underground water services, *korez* systems, that for apparently some years have been faced with a reduction of available water.

13. The patterns of residence for sharecroppers vary by type and reflect the differences in activity. The *buzgars* interviewed lived about half and half in the study area and in the village of the landowner, a common pattern being that the *buzgar* works the land of the owner in both places. The *kashtagars*, working large plots, on a higher percentage of the crop and sometimes hiring *buzgar* labor, live mostly in the area of study.

14. Eighty-three percent of the land has at least one type of sharecropper associated with it, either on a laborer basis or in full control of the farming arrangement.

15. The ideal as stated was for a sharecropper and landlord to have a long-term working relationship. Except for the largest landowner, however, there was evidence to suggest this ideal was a rarity, with the croppers shifting plots sometimes by the year, sometimes by the crop.

16. Average family size was 10.2 for sharecroppers, with 8.3 for *buzgars* and 12.4 for *kashtagars*. There was no trend for simple or extended families among the sharecroppers generally but a slight trend for simple families (56%) among the 34 families from the areas just north of Helmand, Kandahar-Farah.

17. There is a heavy dependence on sharecroppers in this area probably because of the residence patterns and separated places of landownership. Land leveling, consolidation, effective credit and available tractors should combine to displace this already once displaced population in the not distant future.

18. The problems faced in water management appear to be as much, if not more, local political in nature as technical. By political it is meant the relations and their adjustments between local groups. To improve water management in any given area, these socio-political arrangements must be carefully studied in detail to be able to understand the variables we must manipulate and control.

In theory, the local systems function on a purely democratic basis with the *mirab* being chosen by the landowners to whom he distributes water on an equitable basis. The unequal distribution of wealth and power, however, results in a situation where this ideal is rarely realized.

19. Housing in the study area is limited since high proportions of owners live outside. The settlements are more stable than some of those further to the south, in Aynak and below, with some small owners living on their land, no evidence of migrating villages, and a permanent type housing construction. There is a trend to an even more stable and expensive house type with the introduction of arched mud roofs.

20. There appears to be a preference for running water as opposed to well water. At least this is the justification and rationalization for the use of the irrigation system for all water rather than digging the more convenient wells.

21. Similar studies should be carried out through the entire Shamalan to know what we are working with in terms of the local population. There will be large variations in patterns of settlement, origins and ownership from area to area, which the project should know about if it is to relate to the people in any meaningful way.

Other special studies should be done as needed to understand the local political scene which at any time could so greatly affect the development of the project. If we are to be able to predict potential hazards to the project and attempt to reduce these hazards, we must know, in as much detail as possible, what we are dealing with in terms of the socio-politico-economic structure. Such information can be gathered with a minimum of effort and expense.

List of Terms:

The following list is of terms used in the text of the report. The spelling should only be considered approximate to the local population and the definitions apply only to the limited area, that is, in other regions the definitions for a particular term may change.

<i>Buzgar</i>	A sharecropper whose input is labor only, he makes no decisions about the crop and he receives 1/5 of the produce.
Extended family	A household containing more than one married couple.
<i>Graw</i> (grau)	A system of loan where the borrower gives up the use of his land to the lender for a specified amount. There is no time limit nor interest as such. There is likely a minimum time (sometimes 2 years) to insure the lender a sizable profit on his transactions.
<i>Jerib</i>	A measure of land equal to about ½ acre. It is an official measure about which few villagers can make realistic use. They talk in terms of measures of wheat sown.
<i>Kashtagar</i>	A sharecropper whose input generally include labor, work animals, and seed. He is the decision maker on crops produced and his share is 50 percent. His decision, however, is probably highly colored by the desires of the landowner.
<i>Korez</i>	A system of underground channels that delivers irrigation water from points where water plains are being tapped

near mountain chains to village lands, sometimes over great distances. These tunnels are punctuated by wells from the surface which allow for easier cleaning and maintenance of the system. The *korez* systems function to bring this otherwise unused source of water to the surface, without pumping, and to reduce evaporation rates in generally hot, dry regions. Sometimes these systems connect a river source to land in need of water.

Malik An officially recognized spokesman and representative of a community who is responsible in cases of official contacts with the government. In theory, he is chosen in some way by the community but frequently the office is held in one family for more than one generation.

Mon A weight measure of about 10 pounds.

Mirab An indigenous water-master who is responsible for the control of the irrigation water distribution system in a given area. He is chosen by and paid by the landowners for his task.

Mullah A man whose training and profession is in religion; a local prayer leader and sometimes teacher for a community, settlement or mosque.

Said (Sayyid) Reputed descendent of the prophet Mohammad, found throughout the Arab and non-Arab Muslim world.

Simple family A household containing one married couple.

ATTACHMENT 1

Relation to land _____ for _____ Parcel No. _____

Name _____ Father's Name _____

Tribe _____ Sub-Tribe _____

Origin _____

Residence _____ No. years there _____

Malik _____ Residence _____

Household size _____ Simple _____ Extended _____

Agriculture workers _____ Other workers _____

Land in area _____ Land outside area _____

Crops _____

Work animals _____

Kashtagars	No.	On	Jeribs	Names
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
Buzgars	No.	On	Jeribs	
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Laborers	No.	On	Jeribs	
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Other married males in Household and relatives in area.


ATTACHMENT 2

Sketch Map of First 30 Km. of the Shamalan Area



ATTACHMENT 2

Sketch Map of First Mirab Area: Shamalan



ATTACHMENT 3

Average Household Size by Type of Household

	Owner	Kashtagar	Buzgar
Average Household Size	10.8	12.4	8.3
Average Simple Household Size	6.2	6.7	4.9
Average Extended Household Size	14.6	17.4	12.6

Average Number of Agricultural Workers by Type Household

	Owner	Kashtagar	Buzgar
Average Number Per Household	2.5	2.8	2.0
Average Number Per Simple Household	1.3	1.8	1.3
Average Number Per Extended Household	4.1	3.7	2.9